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Abstract
This paper pursues two aims. First, to show that the block universe
view, regarding the universe as a timelessly existing four-dimensional
world, is the only one that is consistent with special relativity. Second,
to argue that special relativity alone can resolve the debate on whether
the world is three-dimensional or four-dimensional. The argument ad-
vanced in the paper is that if the world were three-dimensional the
kinematic consequences of special relativity and more importantly the
experiments confirming them would be impossible.
1 Introduction
If one can talk about a widely (explicitly or implicitly) accepted view on
reality it is presentism – the view that it is only the present (the three-
dimensional world at the moment ‘now’) that exists. This common-sense
view, which reflects the way we perceive the world, has two defining features:
(i) the world exists only at the constantly changing present moment (past
and future do not exist) and (ii) the world is three-dimensional.
Our immediate perception of the external world reveals it as being in
a constant change. The concept of time and its three components – past,
present, and future – are deduced from what we directly perceive. And
indeed, in ancient Greece Heraclitus argued that the world is perpetually
changing, but did not explicitly discuss the relationship between change and
time (as the excerpts from his writings that reached us appear to show).
According to him everything flows (panta rhei), everything moves (panta
chorei) [1, p. 65]. Later Aristotle effectively arrived at the conclusion that
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everything exists only at the moment ‘now’ since it is this moment that
“connects past and future time” [2, p. 301] which themselves do not exist:
“one part of [time] has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is
not yet” [2, p. 297]. Aristotle made another contribution to the presentist
view by arguing that the world is three-dimensional: “A magnitude if divis-
ible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if three a body. Beyond
these there is no other magnitude, because the three dimensions are all that
there are” [3] (see also [4]).
The two defining features of presentism – the world exists only at the
present moment and the world is three-dimensional – are intrinsically linked:
if the world is three-dimensional it exists only at one moment of time and
vice versa. Saint Augustine made the first step toward the realization of
that link by trying to determine the duration of the moment ‘now’. He
concluded that the present moment cannot have any duration: “In fact the
only time that can be called present is an instant... For if its duration were
prolonged, it could be divided into past and future. When it is present it
has no duration” [5, p. 119]. In order to see the link between the three-
dimensionality of the world and its existence only at the moment ‘now’
assume that the present moment has a finite duration. For the sake of the
argument let that duration be 10 s. As these 10 s are not further divisible
into past, present, and future they are all present. Therefore every object
and the whole world would exist at once1 at all seconds of the finite moment
‘now’. This means that all objects would be extended in time. For instance,
a moving object would exist at once at all points of a distance it travels for
10 s. However, objects that are extended in time are four-dimensional, not
three-dimensional. The presentist view is based on the fact that we seem to
perceive three-dimensional objects, i.e objects that do not appear to exist
at more than one instant of time. So, on the presentist view the fact that
the world is regarded as three-dimensional implies that the present moment
must be an instant with no duration.
Saint Augustine could not have possibly realized that the duration of
the moment ‘now’ must be zero (as he concluded) in order that the world be
three-dimensional. But presentists should see this clearly. The realization of
the link between the three-dimensionality of the world and its existence only
at the present moment (whose duration is zero) shows that the past and the
future do not exist in any sense in the framework of the presentist view.
The past and the future are merely sets of previous and forthcoming states
1Obviously, here “at once” does not mean “simultaneously”. Throughout the paper
“at once” will be used timelessly to mean “given as a whole” or “given in its entirety”.
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of the three-dimensional world which exists solely at the present moment.
But states do not exist on their own without the entity they are states of.
Another view on reality that is ontologically different from presentism
and for this reason is completely counter-intuitive is the block universe view.
It can be traced back to the eternal and unchanging being of the Eleatic
school of philosophy [1, Chap. X]. Saint Augustine also believed in an ever-
present eternity which, however, was not accessible to humans [5]. In 1884
Hinton wrote about a four-dimensional world in which the ordinary particles
are regarded as threads [6, 7]. The scientific birth of the block universe view,
however, was in 1908 when Minkowski proposed that space and time should
be united into an inseparable four-dimensional entity – spacetime – which
he called the world. He began his talk at the 80th Assembly of German
Natural Scientists and Physicians with the now famous introduction: “The
views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from
the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. They are
radical. Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade
away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve
an independent reality” [8, p. 75].
It should be pointed out that Minkowski viewed the idea of the world
as being not objectively split into space and time as deduced from the ex-
perimental evidence and not just as an alternative representation of spe-
cial relativity. That is why a genuine understanding of special relativity
could not be achieved without regarding spacetime as a four-dimensional
space whose four dimensions are entirely given2 (like the two dimensions
of a plane). Minkowski left no doubt that the idea of spacetime should be
understood in this way by pointing out one immediate consequence of that
idea, namely that one could not talk about one space any more. He no-
ticed that “neither Einstein nor Lorentz made any attack on the concept of
space” [8, p. 83] and stressed that the idea of many spaces is inevitable in
special relativity: “We should then have in the world no longer space, but
an infinite number of spaces, analogously as there are in three-dimensional
space an infinite number of planes. Three-dimensional geometry becomes a
2It might appear tempting to regard the temporal dimension as not entirely given, but
if this were the case spacetime would not be four-dimensional – one cannot talk about
a four-dimensional entity if all dimensions are not equally existent. Spacetime is not
like space since the nature of the temporal dimension is different from the nature of the
spatial dimensions, but this has nothing to do with the equal existence of all dimensions
of spacetime (like the different nature of physical objects and phenomena has nothing to
do with their existence). In this respect I completely share the position of Taylor and
Wheeler regarding the temporal and spatial dimensions of spacetime: ”Equal footing, yes;
same nature, no” [10].
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chapter in four-dimensional physics. Now you know why I said at the outset
that space and time are to fade away into shadows, and only a world in
itself will subsist” [8, pp. 79–80]. But although Minkowski demonstrated
that the consequences of special relativity (length contraction, for instance)
found a natural explanation in the four-dimensional spacetime, he did not
find it necessary to argue that these consequences were possible only in a
four-dimensional world.
Unfortunately, the depth of Minkowski’s idea does not seem to have
been immediately and fully appreciated as evident from Sommerfeld’s notes
on Minkowski’s paper: “What will be the epistemological attitude towards
Minkowski’s conception of the time-space problem is another question, but,
as it seems to me, a question which does not essentially touch his physics”
[11].
About two decades after Minkowski’s four-dimensional formulation of
special relativity Weyl appeared to have realized that Minkowski spacetime
is not merely a mathematical space but represents a four-dimensional exter-
nal world which is not directly reflected in our perceptions: “The objective
world simply is, it does not happen” [12]. In 1952 Einstein added the fifth
appendix “Relativity and the problem of space” to the fifteen edition of his
book “Relativity: The Special and General Theory” in which he seemed to
have arrived at the same conclusion: “It appears... more natural to think
of physical reality as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto,
the evolution of a three-dimensional existence” [13]. However, neither Weyl
nor Einstein showed that the four-dimensionality of the world unavoidably
follows from the consequences of special relativity.
The first argument designed to demonstrate that one of the basic conse-
quences of special relativity – relativity of simultaneity – inescapably implies
a four-dimensional world was advanced by Rietdijk [14] in 1966 and by Put-
nam [15] in 1967. Later the same argument was rediscovered by Maxwell
[16] in 1985. However, it was criticized twice by Stein [17, 18] – in 1968 after
Rietdijk and Putnam published their papers and in 1991 after the appear-
ance of Maxwell’s paper. This double criticism appears to have created the
impression that Stein “has settle the issue” [19].
Stein’s criticism of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument is revisited in Sec-
tion 2. A closer examination of this argument shows that Stein’s objections
not only do not disprove it but, in fact, further reinforce it. Section 3 de-
velops a more general argument which demonstrates that the consequences
of special relativity and the experiments which confirm them would be im-
possible if the world were three-dimensional and if the existence of the ob-
jects involved in these experiments is absolute. This shows that only the
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block universe view does not contradict the experimental evidence which
supports special relativity. The issue of whether or not an equivalence of
three-dimensional and four-dimensional presentations of special relativity
implies an equivalence of three-dimensional and four-dimensional ontologies
is discussed in Section 4.
2 Has Stein Disproved the Rietdijk-Putnam Ar-
gument?
To analyze Stein’s objections let us briefly describe a version of the argument
he criticized. Consider three inertial observers A, B, and C in relative motion
whose worldlines are shown in Fig. 1. Observers A and B meet at event M.
The third observer C is represented by a vertical worldline in the figure
which means that A is approaching C, whereas B is receding from C.
tA tBtC
C
P
Q
B A
M
B's present
A's present
Figure 1: Three inertial observers A, B, and C are in relative motion. Events
M and Q belong to A’s present and are therefore real and determinate for
A, whereas for B real and determinate are events M and P since they lie in
B’s present.
Two events P and Q happen with C at different moments of his proper
time. Since an event in relativity is defined as an object, a field point, or
a space point at a given moment of time the events P and Q are simply
the observer C existing at the moments tCP and t
C
Q of his proper time, re-
spectively. As event P is simultaneous with event M according to B and
therefore lies in observer B’s present, both events M and P are equally real
for B (according to Putnam) or equally determinate for B (according to
Rietdijk). Event Q is simultaneous with event M in A’s reference frame;
that is, it belongs to observer A’s present. This means that both events
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M and Q are equally real and determinate for A. Since Putnam and Riet-
dijk assumed that the reality and determinateness of an event is absolute
(observer-independent) they arrived at the conclusion that if event Q is real
(determinate) for observer A, it should be as real (determinate) for observer
B and for observer C as well. Therefore, observer C should exist at once at
both moments tCP and t
C
Q of his proper time since events P and Q (corre-
sponding to the two moments) are equally real. But such a situation is not
possible in the common-sense (pre-relativistic) view according to which it is
only the present – the three-dimensional world at the moment ‘now’ – which
exists. This led Rietdijk and Putnam to conclude that relativity of simul-
taneity, when applied to what exists, contradicts the presentist view and is
possible only in a four-dimensional world where the histories of the physical
objects are entirely realized in their four-dimensional worldtubes. In such
a view the presents of observers A and B are equally real because they are
merely three-dimensional cross-sections of the four-dimensional world.
Stein criticized the Rietdijk-Putnam argument since it incorrectly used
the concept of distant present events (i.e. the concept of the present) which
is based on the pre-relativistic division of events into past, present, and
future. He pointed out that “in the theory of relativity the only reasonable
notion of ‘present to a space-time point’ is that of the mere identity relation:
present to a given point is that point alone – literally ‘here-now’ ” [18, p. 159].
This is a valid objection but it does not affect the ultimate conclusion of
the Rietdijk-Putnam argument – that the world is four-dimensional. The
reason is the following.
In fact, Stein’s criticism of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument supports the
first part of the argument – that presentism contradicts special relativity and
is therefore wrong. And indeed the present, i.e. the three-dimensional world
at the moment ‘now’, can be defined only in terms of the pre-relativistic divi-
sion of events into past, present, and future. More specifically, the present is
defined in terms of simultaneity – as everything that exists simultaneously at
the present moment. Therefore Stein’s argument that one cannot talk about
distant present events in the framework of special relativity is an argument
against presentism. So, Stein’s criticism is effectively directed against the
three-dimensionality of the world since a three-dimensional world consists
of distant presents events (everything that exists simultaneously at the mo-
ment ‘now’). But, unfortunately, he did not address the most fundamental
question Rietdijk and Putnam had raised – what is the dimensionality of
the world according to special relativity? Had he done that he would have
had two options:
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• accept the conclusion of Rietdijk and Putnam that we live in a four-
dimensional block universe,
• regard the event “here-now” as the only real one.
The latter option, however, does not appear realistic since such a view
clearly amounts to event solipsism – for every observer the world would be
reduced to a single event (the event “here-now”). Once the question “What
is the dimensionality of the world?” is asked, one could not hold the view
that only the event “here-now” is real because that would mean that for
every observer the world would be zero-dimensional (just one event). It
should be stressed that it amounts to a contradiction in terms to say that
the world is four-dimensional, but for every observer only the event “here-
now” is real. If the world is four-dimensional all its events are equally real;
otherwise it would not be four-dimensional3. This shows that in spacetime
it is impossible to have an event, representing the event “here-now”, which
is “more real” than the other events. Therefore, objective flow of time
and objective becoming are impossible in a four-dimensional world, if they
imply that there are events which are “more real” than the other spacetime
events. For this reason the question of the dimensionality of the world clearly
precedes, in my view, the questions of time flow and becoming and should
be resolved first.
Stein could not argue that existence should be relative (frame- or observer-
dependent), which would preserve the three-dimensionality of the world and
would allow two observers in relative motion to have different presents, i.e.
different three-dimensional worlds, because this would mean that he would
be again using the concept of distance present events applied to each ob-
server. In such a way Stein’s criticism of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument not
only does not disprove it but effectively constitutes another argument for the
block universe view: the world cannot be three-dimensional since a three-
dimensional world is defined in terms of the pre-relativistic division of events
and therefore the only option that remains is a four-dimensional world. This
argument appears to be even more rigorous than the Rietdijk-Putnam ar-
gument because both Rietdijk and Putnam used the pre-relativistic concept
of distant present events to arrive at the conclusion that the world is four-
dimensional, whereas by pointing out the meaninglessness of that concept in
special relativity Stein effectively demonstrated the contradiction between
3Similarly, one could not say that only one point of a line is real because that would
mean that the line would be reduced to a point and there would be a zero-dimensional,
not one-dimensional space.
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the presentist (three-dimensionalist) view and relativity which meant that
it is the four-dimensionalist view that is in agreement with relativity.
In terms of its real value Stein’s criticism is similar to Weingard’s criti-
cism of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument. In 1972 Weingard wrote [20]:
In his 1967 [paper] Hilary Putnam concludes that all events in
special relativistic spacetime, whether past, present, or future,
are equally real, i.e. that a tenseless concept of existence is the
appropriate concept of existence in a special relativistic world.
Although I believe this conclusion is correct, I think Putnam’s
argument is not.
Weingard, like Stein, pointed out that Putnam’s argument is wrong be-
cause it is based on the pre-relativistic concept of distant present events4.
Despite being formulated in terms of pre-relativistic concepts I think the
Rietdijk-Putnam argument is perfectly valid for the reason given in the
next section.
3 Only the Four-dimensionalist View is Compati-
ble with Special Relativity
The Rietdijk-Putnam argument can be easily generalized if the question of
the dimensionality of the world according to special relativity is explicitly
addressed. One can start to discuss that question by pointing out that on
the pre-relativistic (presentist) view the world is three-dimensional – it is
the present (Fig. 2). Then there are two ways to demonstrate the impact
of special relativity on this view. First one can point out that the world
cannot be three-dimensional since such a world is defined in terms of the
pre-relativistic division of events into past, present, and future as seen in
Fig. 2. Therefore the debate over the dimensionality of the world is resolved
in favour of the four-dimensionalist view. This is the conclusion that follows
from Stein’s argument against the Rietdijk-Putnam argument.
The second approach to determining the dimensionality of the world
according to relativity is precisely the generalization of the Rietdijk-Putnam
argument. One starts with the pre-relativistic view of the world. Then it
inescapably follows that having different sets of simultaneous events two
observers in relative motion have different presents, i.e. different three-
dimensional worlds. If existence is absolute, it follows that the world must
4Formally, Stein’s and Weingard’s objections are different but they boil down to the
same point – that the pre-relativistic division of events makes no sense in special relativity.
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Figure 2: On the presentist view it is only the present – the three-
dimensional world at the moment ‘now’ – that exists.
be four-dimensional in order that relativity of simultaneity be possible: the
two observers will have different three-dimensional cross-sections of the four-
dimensional world which they will regard as their presents. If we assume that
the world were three-dimensional, two observers in relative motion would
have a common three-dimensional world and therefore a common set of
simultaneous events which means that simultaneity would be absolute in
contradiction with special relativity.
So, the generalized version of the Rietdijk-Putnam argument does make
use of the pre-relativistic concept of present events but that is a completely
legitimate and natural approach – one starts with the pre-relativistic (three-
dimensionalist) view of the world (defined in terms of that concept) and
by taking into account relativity of simultaneity wants to see how special
relativity affects this view. Moreover, the kinematic relativistic effects (with
the exception of the twin paradox) can be formulated only in terms of the
pre-relativistic division of events if the existence of the objects involved in
these effects is explicitly taken into account. And indeed as we have seen
relativity of simultaneity makes sense only in terms of the pre-relativistic
concept of present events when we ask what exists simultaneously. If one
objects that the question “What exists simultaneously?” does not appear
to be well defined, it will be shown below that the length contraction effect
makes sense only in terms of the pre-relativistic concept of present events.
When the issue of the dimensionality of the world according to relativity
is explicitly addressed it does appear that there is no alternative to the four-
dimensionalist view. This is best seen if one assumed that the world were
three-dimensional. Then not only relativity of simultaneity but all kinematic
relativistic effects would be impossible [21, 22, 23]. This is immediately
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evident for the cases of length contraction and time dilation since these
effects are merely manifestations of relativity of simultaneity.
To demonstrate the impossibility of the kinematic relativistic effects in
the framework of the presentist (three-dimensionalist) view consider for ex-
ample the length contraction effect. Two observers A and B in relative
motion meet at event M. The observers are represented by their worldlines
as shown in Fig. 3. A rod at rest in A’s reference frame is represented by
its worldtube.
tB tA
xA
xB
LB
LAM
A B
Figure 3: A rod represented by its worldtube is at rest in observer A’s
reference frame.
At event M the two observers determine the length of the rod in their
reference frames. For B the rod is of shorter length LB < LA. As seen in
Fig. 3 the contraction of the rod is only possible if the worldtube of the rod
is a real four-dimensional object, which means that the rod exists equally
at all moments of its history. The instantaneous three-dimensional spaces
of A and B intersect the worldtube of the rod at two different places and
B’s cross-section is smaller than A’s cross-section. If the rod’s worldtube
were not a real four-dimensional object, i.e. if the rod existed only at its
present moment and therefore were a three-dimensional object (say, A’s rod
which is represented by the cross-section LA), no length contraction would
be possible – A’s rod of length LA would exist for B as well5 and B would
measure the same rod with the same length LA.
It seems little attention has been payed to the fact that A and B do
not measure the same three-dimensional rod; the rod which B measures
5If the rod existed only at its present moment, which would mean that it is ontologically
a three-dimensional object (retaining its identity as a three-dimensional object in time),
it would not exist in its past and future. Therefore, B’s cross-section of length LB would
lie in the rod’s past and would not exist.
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is a different three-dimensional object. This is clearly seen in Fig. 3 – at
event M both A and B know that the rod exists for each of them, but this
is only possible if there are two different three-dimensional cross-sections of
the rod’s worldtube, i.e. two different three-dimensional rods. If one decides
not to trust spacetime diagrams too much, it is easily demonstrated that the
same conclusion follows directly from relativity of simultaneity. The differ-
ent parts of the spatially extended three-dimensional rod constitute a set of
events which exist simultaneously for A. As B has a different set of simulta-
neous events (the events constituting the cross-section LB) it unavoidably
follows that B measures a different three-dimensional rod. In order that
this be possible the rod’s worldtube must be a real four-dimensional ob-
ject. So, when we say that A and B measure the same rod we refer to the
worldtube of the rod, but the observers regard different three-dimensional
cross-section of the rod’s worldtube as their rod which means that they do
measure different three-dimensional rods.
The fact that B measures a different three-dimensional rod appears to
rule out any explanation of the length contraction effect that involves a
deformation of the rod caused by forces acting on the rod’s atoms along the
lines of the original Lorentz-FitzGerald proposal and what Bell [24] called
‘Lorentzian pedagogy’ (see also [25]). The reason is that the deformation
(or dynamical) explanation of the length contraction implies that A and B
measure the same three-dimensional rod, whereas relativity of simultaneity
requires that A and B measure different three-dimensional rods. Perhaps the
most convincing argument that the deformation explanation of the length
contraction is wrong, however, is that this explanation cannot account for
the contraction of space itself where there are no atoms and no forces that
can cause its deformation. For instance, the muon experiment [26] cannot
be explained if it is assumed that space does not contract [27].
Let us now see why the length contraction can be formulated only in
terms of the concept of distant present events which demonstrates that this
concept is still used in special relativity when the existence of the physical
objects involved in this relativistic effect is described in three-dimensional
language. When A and B meet at M what everyone of them measures is
what exists for him – his present rod, that is, all parts of the spatially
extended three-dimensional rod which exist simultaneously at the moment
‘now’ of the observer. Therefore the three-dimensional rod constitutes (is
defined as) a set of distant present events and both observers must use this
pre-relativistic concept in order to talk about a three-dimensional rod. The
same situation occurs in the time dilation effect – it too can be formulated
only in terms of distant present events when one considers the existence of
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the physical objects that take part in this effect [21, Chap. 5]. But the
very fact that this concept has no meaning in special relativity implies that
there is nothing three-dimensional in the objective world. In the case of
length contraction each of the observers A and B in Fig. 3 measures a three-
dimensional rod, but it is not a real three-dimensional object in a sense that
it is not an object which retains its identity through time as the same three-
dimensional object. What is real is the rod’s worldtube. Its existence is
deduced from the existence of length contraction – if the worldtube did not
exist no length contraction would be possible (below I will provide further
arguments for this strong claim).
A’s and B’s rods are not real three-dimensional objects because the
rod’s worldtube is an indivisible four-dimensional entity which is not objec-
tively divided into three-dimensional cross-sections6. Therefore the three-
dimensional rod every observer measures is just a description of the rod’s
worldtube in terms of the ordinary three-dimensional language. This situ-
ation is analogous to the one that arises when the x− y planes of different
coordinate systems “cut” different two-dimensional cross-sections of a cylin-
der – those sections are not real two-dimensional objects since the cylinder
itself is not objectively divided into different two-dimensional cross-sections.
tB tA
xA
xB
LB
LAM
A B L
Figure 4: What observers A and B see is the same cross-section L of the
rod’s worldtube. In general, when two observers A and B in relative motion
meet at event M they see the past light cone.
Our common-sense belief in the existence of three-dimensional objects
and a three-dimensional world originates from the way we interpret what
we perceive. For instance, we believe we see three-dimensional objects and
6This is a direct consequence of the fact that spacetime is not objectively divided into
different spaces, i.e. different three-dimensional cross-sections.
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a three-dimensional world. However, this is clearly not the case as seen in
Fig. 4. Observers A and B, who are in relative motion, have different sets
of simultaneous events and therefore different three-dimensional worlds, but
at event M they both see the same thing – the past light cone. They
interpret all images contained in the light signals which constitute the past
light cone in a sense that at event M they perceive a three-dimensional
world. This is an obvious misconception since the past light cone does
not form a three-dimensional space or a three-dimensional world which are
defined in terms of simultaneity – a three-dimensional world is defined as all
space points and all three-dimensional objects that correspond to the same
moment of time. It is obvious that the points of the past light cone do not
correspond to the same moment of the time of each of the observers. In
particular, A and B have different three-dimensional rods, but they see the
same three-dimensional cross-section L which, however, cannot be regarded
as a three-dimensional rod since all parts of a three-dimensional object exist
simultaneously at one moment (the moment ‘now’). By contrast, the parts of
the three-dimensional cross-section L correspond to different moments of the
time of each observer7. It follows from here that it is not possible to interpret
the length contraction in a sense that it is the same three-dimensional rod
that exists for A and B, but they see it differently.
The fact that A and B have different three-dimensional rods means that
the two rods of lengths LA and LB, respectively, belong to the presents of A
and B that correspond to event M. However, it is obvious that the observers
do not usually measure the length of their rods at M since in most cases a
measurement takes some time and each of the observers sees his rod a little
later, not at the moment when light signals left simultaneously the end points
of the rod. But when the observers take into account that delay they arrive
at the conclusion that at the event M they had different sets of simultaneous
events and therefore different three-dimensional rods. So, the fact that
observers are not usually in an immediate contact with what they measure
does not affect the conclusion that A and B have different three-dimensional
rods – a conclusion which demonstrates that on the presentist view the
length contraction effect is impossible since on that view the rod exists only
at its present moment as a single three-dimensional object which means
that A and B cannot have different three-dimensional rods as relativity of
simultaneity requires.
7The fact that what we see are images which cannot be interpreted to represent three-
dimensional objects is itself another indication that our senses cannot be fully trusted
especially when it comes to such fundamental questions as the dimensionality of the world.
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Although the realization of the physical meaning of length contraction –
that A and B have different three-dimensional rods – is a direct consequence
of relativity of simultaneity, it is so counter-intuitive that it is worth to con-
sider a thought experiment in which the measurement of the rod’s length
is instantaneous in A’s and B’s reference frames. This thought experiment
will also provide additional arguments supporting the claim that the three-
dimensionalist view contradicts the experiments which confirmed the kine-
matic relativistic effects.
b
A
b
r
r rg
xA (tb A)
xA (tMA = t
r
A)
xB (tM
B)
g
xA (tgA)
tA
b
g
tB
B
M
Figure 5: Observers A and B, who are in relative motion, meet at event
M. A rod at rest in A’s reference frame has lights mounted on its two end
points and on its middle point. In A’s frame all lights of the rod were
simultaneously green an instant before the meeting with B; they are all red
at the moment of the meeting, and their color changes simultaneously to
blue for A an instant after the meeting. Each of A and B determines the
rod’s length instantaneously in his frame by taking snapshots of the rod’s
end and middle points with cameras placed at different points on A’s x axis
and on B’s x axis along which the rod moves. The rod which B measures
consists of parts of A’s past rod (with the green light), present rod (with
the red light), and future rod (with the blue light).
Let the rod again be at rest in A’s reference frame (Fig. 5). There are
lights mounted on the end and middle points of the rod. Every instant the
color of the lights changes simultaneously in A’s reference frame: an instant
before the meeting of A and B all three lights are green at the moment tgA,
at the moment of the meeting tMA = t
r
A the lights are red, and an instant
after the meeting they are blue at tbA. As seen in Fig. 5 A and B move
along their x axes and the rod is positioned parallel to A’s x axis. Both A
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and B place cameras at different points of their x axes. All cameras have
clocks which have been synchronized in advance in each frame by using the
Einstein rule (assuming that the back and forth velocity of light in A’s and
B’s frame is the same). The cameras have been synchronized in such a way
that all clocks in each frame show zero at the event of the meeting M.
When A and B meet at M at the moment tMA = 0 of A’s time and at
tMB = 0 of B’s time they determine the length of the rod instantaneously
in their reference frames by taking snapshots of its end and middle points.
Some time after the meeting A and B collect all pictures from their sets of
cameras to see the results of their experiments. Observer A sees that the
three pictures (showing the middle and the two end points of the rod) display
the same time tMA = 0 and the same color – red, red, and red. Observer B
also sees that the three pictures show the same time tMB = 0, but the colors
in the three pictures are green, red, and blue.
Let us now ask what exists for A and B at M. As at the instant of the
meeting all three red lights of the rod are simultaneous for A at his present
moment tMA = t
r
A what exists for him at M is the red rod which lies in A’s
present. The green rod existed for A one instant before the meeting and is
in his past while the blue rod will exist one instant after the meeting and
is in his future. According to the presentist view the green and blue rods
do not exist for A at tMA = t
r
A since they belong to A’s past and future,
respectively.
As observer B has a different class of simultaneous events at M it does
follow that at the moment tMB the lights of the rod will not all be red for B.
The fact that at M in B’s present lies a three-dimensional rod whose front end
point, middle point, and rear end point are green, red, and blue, respectively
(B is moving to the left in Fig. 5) means that the green–red–blue rod, which
is present for B, consists of part of A’s past rod (the front end point with
green light), part of A’s present rod (the middle part of the rod, which is
also present and therefore exists for A at the moment of the meeting), and
part of A’s future rod (the rear end point with blue light). As all parts of
an spatially extended three-dimensional object exist simultaneously at the
present moment of an observer, the three-dimensional rod that exists for B
at his present moment tMB is different from the three-dimensional rod of A
existing at his present moment tMA = t
r
A. (The event of the meeting M in
Fig. 5 is the only common present event for both observers.) The rod of
each observer is composed of a mixture of parts of the past, present, and
future rods of the other observer. Therefore, the conclusion that each of
the observers A and B measures a different three-dimensional rod is indeed
inevitable.
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Imagine now that this experiment has been performed and, as expected,
confirmed both the length contraction and the relativity of simultaneity.
What conclusions can be drawn from it? The observers A and B will be
convinced that the only way to explain their pictures is to assume that the
rod they measured exists equally (at once) at all moments of its history in
time. Their reason is that the experiment directly confirmed this conclusion:
parts of the rod’s past, present, and future (which are also A’s past, present,
and future since the rod is at rest in A’s frame) exist simultaneously as B’s
present rod. A’s present rod also contains parts of B’s past, present, and
future rod8. This would not be possible if the rod did not exist equally
in its past, present, and future9. Therefore A and B conclude that their
experiment has a profound physical meaning – it proves that all physical
objects are extended in time which means that they are four-dimensional.
A and B believe they can claim that a single experiment, which allowed a
single interpretation, proved the four-dimensionality of the world. However,
a philosopher of science would immediately disagree. He will point out that
the claim is based on an implicit ontological assumption – that the existence
of the physical objects is absolute (observer- or frame-independent). Since
this claim is deduced from an experiment no other ontological assumptions
seem to be needed. For instance, it does not appear necessary to assume
(i) that A’s and B’s sets of simultaneous events are ontologically equivalent
since both A and B used the same rule to synchronize the clocks of their
cameras, and (ii) that A and B are ontologically equivalent since they carried
out identical experiments10.
The philosopher of science will explain that the experiment performed
8This specific experiment would allow A and B to arrive at the idea of the rod’s
worldtube even if they never heard of Minkowski.
9The experiment depicted in Fig. 5 deals only with the immediate past and future of
the rod, but one can add other observers that also meet A at M but their velocities relative
to A are greater than B’s velocity. The present rods of these observers will contain parts
of more distant past and future of A’s rod.
10Even if A and B are not equivalent (inertial) observers the same conclusion will be
drawn. Imagine that two inertial observers A and B and an accelerated observer C meet
at M (but A’s frame is not C’s comoving inertial reference frame at M). C’s present rod
will again be a mixture of A’s past, present, and future rod and the conclusion that
the rod’s worldtube must exist follows. In this case C will use (before the meeting)
the same synchronization procedure but with a small correction to the velocity of light
(proportional to c−2) [21, Chap. 8] which, however, does not affect the final conclusion.
This is immediately seen if B’s frame is C’s comoving inertial reference frame at M which
means that B and C have a common set of simultaneous events at M. Therefore B and C
will have the same contracted rod that consists of parts of A’s past, present, and future
rod.
16
ItA = 10 y
T
A B
tB = 5 y
tA = 5 y
tA = tB = 0
M
D
I T
A B
M
D
B1
B2
a b
Figure 6: Twins A and B are represented by their worldlines. At the event
of departure D twin B starts a journey at a speed that is close to the speed
of light. At event T he turns back and meets his brother at event M.
by A and B allows two interpretations:
(i) if existence is absolute, the simultaneous existence of parts of A’s past,
present, and future rod as B’s present rod (and vice versa) does lead to the
conclusion that the rod must exist equally at all moments of its history;
(ii) if existence is relative (observer- or frame-dependent), each observer
will claim that it is only his three-dimensional rod that exists.
A and B admit that their experiment allows a second interpretation, but
since the experiment is, in their view, the ultimate judge they are convinced
that it is only the experiment that can decide whether the world is three-
or four-dimensional. They agree that, formally, existence can be regarded
as relativized. A and B realize that such an assumption preserves the three-
dimensionality of the world, but it is an alternative option to the conclusion
of a four-dimensional world only in the case of the reciprocal length contrac-
tion and time dilation which are based on relativity of simultaneity. That
is why A and B concentrate their attention on the twin paradox since it is
an absolute, not a reciprocal effect, which means that no relativity of si-
multaneity is involved in its explanation and therefore the relativization of
existence should not be an alternative explanation.
And indeed the derivation and the explanation of the twin paradox
(Fig. 6) are based on the triangle inequality in the pseudo-Euclidean ge-
ometry of spacetime which presupposes the existence of the twins’s world-
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lines (in order to be able to talk about a triangle in spacetime). In other
words, the explanation of the twin paradox is in the framework of the four-
dimensionalist view: the length of twin B’s worldline between the event of
the departure D and the event of the meeting M is shorter than the length
of twin A’s worldline between the same events (in Fig. 6 twin B’s worldline
is longer but this is caused by the representation of a pseudo-Euclidean re-
lation on the Euclidean surface of the page). This means that B measures
less time between D and M than his brother.
Let us now see how the view of relativized existence contradicts the
experiments that confirm the twin paradox11. Assume that the world is
objectively three-dimensional as this view states. This is an ontological
assumption; the description of the world in a three-dimensional language
is a completely different issue. Obviously, in such a world the twins exist
as three-dimensional bodies at their moments ‘now’ only. When A and
B meet at event M they both will exist at this event and nowhere else –
neither in their pasts not in their futures. As seen in Fig. 6 at M twin A’s
clock shows that ten years have passed between events D and M, whereas
according to twin B’s clock only five years have elapsed between the same
events. Both twins agree that B is younger. As on both the pre-relativistic
and the relativized three-dimensionalist view time objectively flows the only
way for the twins to explain the five-year difference of their clocks’ readings
at M is to assume that twin B’s time has slown down. The acceleration to
which B is subjected appears to be the only cause for the slowing down of
B’s time. However, that cause has been ruled out by (i) the so-called ‘clock
hypothesis’ according to which the rate of an ideal clock is not affected by its
acceleration [28, 29, 30] (and the experiments which confirm it [31]), and (ii)
the three-clock version of the twin paradox (see, for instance, [32]). Hence
the three-dimensionalist view cannot explain why twin B is younger which
means that this view cannot explain the twin paradox12.
Another argument which, in my view, even more clearly shows that
the three-dimensionalist view contradicts the twin paradox is the following.
What A’s and B’s clocks show is their proper times. So at M the twins
compare their proper times. Given the fact that on the three-dimensionalist
view time objectively flows, the twin paradox and the time dilation make
sense only in terms of a change of the rate of the time flow. But this is
precisely the problem for the three-dimensionalists – the rate of the proper
11This is a summary of an argument which is given in [21, Chap. 5].
12It may appear inviting to “explain” the different readings of the twins’ clocks by saying
that time is frame-dependent in relativity. However, this is not an explanation at all since
the very question is: Why is time frame-dependent in relativity?
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time does not change13 according to special relativity (proper time is an
invariant) which means that when A and B meet at M their clocks should
show the same time.
I believe this argument convincingly shows that the three-dimensionalist
view contradicts not only the twin paradox as a theoretical result but more
importantly all experiments that confirmed it. These experiments also rule
out the ontological assumption that existence should be relativized since this
assumption requires that the world be three-dimensional14.
I think Nature has given us the twin paradox as a valuable gift – the
interpretation of the experiments which confirm it does not appear to need
any ontological assumptions and for this reason these experiments allow a
single interpretation and alone resolve the debate over the dimensionality
of the world.
As we have seen the analysis of relativity of simultaneity, length contrac-
tion, and the twin paradox leaves no doubt that we live in a four-dimensional
block universe in which the whole histories of all objects are realized in their
worldtubes15. The same conclusion is reached when time dilation is ana-
lyzed [21]. What indicates that special relativity alone resolves the issue of
the dimensionality of the world at the macroscopic16 level is the fact that
not only would the kinematic relativistic effects be impossible if the world
were three-dimensional, but the experimental evidence which confirms them
would not be possible either. And indeed any experiments designed to test
the three relativistic effects we discussed – relativity of simultaneity, length
contraction, and the twin paradox – would detect absolute simultaneity, no
length contraction, and no time difference in the twins’ clocks’ readings if
the world were three-dimensional. For instance, the muon experiment [26]
which proves both length contraction and time dilation would be impossible
if the world were three-dimensional.
It is a widely accepted view “that relativistic mechanics does not carry a
particular ontological interpretation upon its sleeve” [34], but the conclusion
that the relativistic effects are possible only in a four-dimensional world
demonstrates that special relativity does contain just one ontology – the
13What is relativistically dilated is not the proper time, but the time of a clock which
is determined by a second clock with respect to which the first clock moves uniformly.
14This means that the length contraction experiment depicted in Fig. 5 has just one
interpretation – the rod’s worldtube must be a real four-dimensional object in order that
the observers A and B have different three-dimensional rods.
15An independent argument for the four-dimensionality of the world comes from the
conventionality of simultaneity [33].
16The macroscopic level of the world is specified here in order to distinguish the issues
of dimensionality of the world in relativity and in string theory, for example.
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four-dimensional ontology – which is deducible from those effects. In light
of the arguments presented here I believe this widely accepted view should
be made more explicit. Here is how Balashov [34] presents it:
It is a well-known fact that one could accept all the empirical
consequences of SR (including length contraction, time dilation,
and so on) and yet insist that there is a privileged inertial ref-
erence frame, in which meter sticks really have the length they
have and time intervals between events refer to the real time.
What should be made more explicit is the physical meaning of such a
privileged inertial frame. In my view, this can be best achieved by asking
what is the dimensionality of the world in which such a frame can exist.
Then, as a privileged inertial frame means a privileged three-dimensional
space, it becomes evident that there are two options: (i) a three-dimensional
world, and (ii) a four-dimensional world in which “associated with this ref-
erence frame would be a set of hyperplanes of simultaneity uniquely slicing
space-time into equivalence classes of absolutely simultaneous events” [34].
I think it is obvious that option (i) contradicts special relativity and in
this sense is empirically distinguishable from it. Option (ii) is, in fact, a block
universe in which the privileged three-dimensional cross-sections (i.e. the
privileged hyperplanes of simultaneity) should be objectively distinguishable
from the three-dimensional cross-sections of the other reference frames. That
this does not appear to be the case is demonstrated in Fig. 5 where both
observers measure directly and instantaneously the length of the rod without
the need of any assumptions or calculations. Assume that A’s rod lies on
such a privileged three-dimensional cross-section, whereas B’s rod lies on an
“ordinary” three-dimensional cross-section. How can the privileged rod of
observer A be objectively distinguishable from the “ordinary” rod of B if that
privileged state cannot be discovered experimentally? Note that due to the
direct measurement of the rod’s length the following explanation would not
work17: “A suggested privileged reference frame would not be distinguished
in any empirical sense and would not be identifiable in any real experience.
Thus the speed of light measured in any inertial frame would still be exactly
c, the number obtained by dividing the apparent distance covered by light
by the apparent time spent” [34].
17It should be noted that the constancy of the velocity of light is not determined as
stated in the quote. Every inertial observer measures the velocity of light in his reference
frame; so no apparent distance and no apparent time are involved in his calculations.
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4 Different Descriptions Versus Different Ontolo-
gies
The arguments advanced in this paper were concerned with the question of
what ontology – three-dimensional or four-dimensional – is compatible with
special relativity. The reason for placing the emphasis on this question is
that it is this question, in my view, which is the most fundamental in the
interpretation of special relativity.
However, McCall and Lowe have recently argued that if the world can
be equivalently described in a three-dimensional and four-dimensional lan-
guage, the debate over the three-dimensional versus four-dimensional on-
tologies should not reflect a real problem: “the three-dimensional and the
four-dimensional descriptions of the world are equivalent” and therefore “it
is not a question of one being true and the other false” [35]. There are
two objections to this claim. First, it is not completely clear in what sense
one can talk about a three-dimensional description of the world. At first
sight it appears that the 1905 Einstein paper is an example of how rela-
tivity can be described in a three-dimensional language. However, upon a
closer examination it turns out that that description presupposes a four-
dimensional ontology. To see that assume the opposite – that the original
Einstein presentation of special relativity implies a three-dimensional ontol-
ogy. But simultaneity is absolute in a three-dimensional world which means
that it is impossible to regard the times t and t′ of two observers in rela-
tive motion on equal footing. Hence, special relativity does not work in a
three-dimensional world. It can be argued that it is Lorentz’s description
of moving bodies, not Einstein’s theory, that implies a three-dimensional
ontology since it regards only one of the times t and t′ as the true time.
Then due to the different ontologies (involving different dimensions of the
world) behind Lorentz’s and Einstein’s theories a rigorous and consistent
application of Lorentz’s ideas would lead to predictions which differ from
the predictions of special relativity18. Lorentz himself admitted the failure
of his approach [36]:
The chief cause of my failure was my clinging to the idea that
the variable t only can be considered as the true time and that
my local time t′ must be regarded as no more than an auxiliary
mathematical quantity. In Einstein’s theory, on the contrary, t′
18For instance, no reciprocity of the length contraction is possible in a three-dimensional
world. Most importantly, however, the experiment shown in Fig. 5 will rule out Lorentz’s
theory if it does presuppose a three-dimensional world.
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plays the same part as t; if we want to describe phenomena in
terms of x′, y′, z′, t′ we must work with these variables exactly as
we could do with x, y, z, t.
The second objection to McCall’s and Lowe’s claim is based on the su-
periority of an ontology over a description. It is a fact that the kinematic
consequences of special relativity can be expressed in three-dimensional lan-
guage but this does not mean that for special relativity a three-dimensional
ontology is as good as the four-dimensional ontology. If a three-dimensional
ontology is consistently presupposed, no three-dimensional description of
the kinematic relativistic effects would be possible since the effects them-
selves would be impossible. This situation can easily be visualized in a
two-dimensional space. Consider a strip on a plane. The x axis of a coordi-
nate system “cuts” the strip at a given location. One can describe the whole
strip by taking into account the one-dimensional cross-sections that corre-
spond to different values of y. That the strip can be equivalently described
in one-dimensional and two-dimensional language does not imply equiva-
lence of the one-dimensional and two-dimensional ontologies – the strip is
either a strip or a line.
The major objection against regarding the three-dimensionalist and four-
dimensionalist views as equivalent is that such an equivalence amounts to
regarding a three-dimensional and a four-dimensional world as equivalent.
Conclusions
It has been shown that the three-dimensionalist view contradicts special
relativity and more importantly the experiments which confirm its conse-
quences. To demonstrate this contradiction relativity of simultaneity, length
contraction, and the twin paradox were analyzed and it was shown that if
one assumed that the world were three-dimensional, neither of these rela-
tivistic effects would be possible.
In this sense special relativity alone appears to provide a definite proof
of the block universe view. One may argue that the arguments discussed
here are insufficient for rejecting the presentist view since those arguments
demonstrated that presentism contradicts only special relativity, not the
other established theories (quantum mechanics, for instance). Such a posi-
tion could hardly be defended because if a view contradicts the experimental
evidence it is definitely wrong. There is just one way to prove that the pre-
sentist view does not contradict the relativistic effects – to demonstrate that
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the experiments which confirm the kinematic consequences of special rela-
tivity can be explained if it is assumed that the world is three-dimensional.
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